Strengthening Kyiv’s hand

Ukrainian drones have made it impossible for the Russian population to isolate itself from the effects of a conflict fought mostly on Ukrainian soil. Attacks on Moscow, in particular, have caused disruptions to air travel within Russia and forced the Russian government to divert dozens of air defence systems to ensure that the capital is protected.

Kyiv’s use of long-range one-way attack (OWA) drones against Russia has done far more damage to Russia’s military and economy than had previously been predicted. Previous drone analysis suggested that the current generation were too easy for defenders to shoot down to have a strategic impact and that prior cases of drone use overstated their strategic benefits.

Unlike traditional military drones, OWA drones are designed to detonate on or above a designated target. In my new research, I analysed Ukraine’s use of these OWA drones from mid-2022 to early 2025 to research whether they can indeed have a notable strategic impact on conflict. I found that Ukraine’s OWA drone campaign was not only able to overcome Russian air defences, but that the impact of the campaign has so far had far-reaching effects, ranging from where Russia has placed its air defences to stoking fuel price rises.

Independent estimates suggest that the damage to Russian oil facilities caused by OWA drones from late 2024 to early 2025 could have cost Russia €650 million. Ukraine’s drone campaign has done so much damage to Russian infrastructure and economy, that it has given Zelensky a significant bargaining chip with Putin.

In early 2024, Ukraine launched a large series of strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. By April that year, NATO officials claimed that the strikes had temporarily halted approximately 15% of Russia’s refining capacity, caused a halt in exports and led to fuel price spikes in Russia.

Once Ukrainian drones started regularly attacking targets deep within Russia, Moscow had to respond. Putin began by moving air defence systems. For instance, in early 2023, the Russian military placed Pantsir air defence systems on Moscow rooftops to intercept OWA drones. Russia was also forced to move air defence systems to public places to reassure the public, once Ukrainian drone strikes began to target objects near major cities.

My assessment is based on data collected from Ukrainian and international journalists as well as independent researchers who documented Ukrainian strikes and the level of damage. On the economic side, Ukrainian drones have struck dozens of oil refineries, depots, and storage facilities. Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on the fossil fuel industry, so damaging these kinds of facilities quickly increases costs and lowers state revenue.

The Russian military is also under pressure from these drone attacks. Ukraine has successfully struck airbases, long-range radars and command centres that Russia needs to continue the war. Notably, Ukraine has struck the drone factory at Yelabuga, where Russia manufactures its own OWA drones, on multiple occasions in an effort to slow its drone campaigns.

The success of the drone campaign gives Ukrainian diplomats a strong bargaining chip. Zelensky’s calls for a ceasefire in the sky and at sea in early 2025 were partially underpinned by the threat Ukraine was able to pose.

Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has said that Putin wanted to pressure Ukraine to end drone attacks by appealing to the US, which indicates that the Kremlin is feeling public pressure on this front. And recently Zelensky offered Trump a “mega deal” to share its drone technology and bring the US up to speed, in exchange for US weapons.

So what accounts for the unexpected impact of Ukraine’s drone use? The data indicates that while individual drones are often easy to shoot down, large numbers of long-range OWA drones attacking multiple targets are tricky to stop. This is because Russia needs to guess where Ukraine will attack and place defences accordingly.

Russia has lots of air defence systems, but it is also the largest country on earth and cannot defend everything at once. The need to pick and choose what areas of the country to defend and which to leave vulnerable creates an air defence dilemma for Russia that Ukraine has exploited.

My findings that an OWA drone campaign can impose serious costs on defenders like Russia are consequential for how other countries should organise their air defences. As the case of Ukraine shows, the fact that these drones combine long-range and relative precision means that attackers can target lots of different sites across the country and take circuitous paths around air defences to get there. These factors make it difficult for all nations to anticipate where the next attack will come from and take action in time.

This is a global problem. The relative ease of manufacturing, procuring, and proliferating OWA drones, compared to a missile, means that many states and terror groups could acquire the ability to launch long-range attacks much more easily than a few years ago. Drone costs tend to be in the tens of thousands of dollars while missiles are often in the hundreds of thousands at the very least.

Countries that might not benefit from procuring OWA drones may still have to find ways to intercept hostile ones. The UK, for instance, found itself shooting down Houthi OWA drones that threatened shipping in the Red Sea last year. The UK development of Dragonfire, a ship-mounted air defence laser for the Royal Navy, was at least partially motivated by this kind of threat.

Even as Kyiv puts more effort into developing conventional missiles, OWA drones have proven too effective to ignore. For the Russian leadership, these attacks create a serious dilemma and force them to pick what parts of the country are “worth” defending. This kind of technology is altering the nature of conflict and other nations will need to take note.